Frowe\u27s Machine Cases by Simkulet, William
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Philosophy & Comparative Religion Department
Faculty Publications Philosophy & Comparative Religion Department
2015
Frowe's Machine Cases
William Simkulet
Cleveland State University, w.simkulet@csuohio.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clphil_facpub
Part of the Philosophy Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Publisher's Statement
This article first appeared in Filosofiska Notiser, Årgång 2, Nr. 2, September 2015, 93-104.
www.filosofiskanotiser.com
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy & Comparative Religion Department at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy & Comparative Religion Department Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of
EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Repository Citation
Simkulet, William, "Frowe's Machine Cases" (2015). Philosophy & Comparative Religion Department Faculty Publications. 1.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clphil_facpub/1
See	discussions,	stats,	and	author	profiles	for	this	publication	at:
http://www.researchgate.net/publication/281971561
Frowe's	Machine	Cases
ARTICLE	·	SEPTEMBER	2015
READS
5
1	AUTHOR:
William	Simkulet
Cleveland	State	University
13	PUBLICATIONS			2	CITATIONS			
SEE	PROFILE
Available	from:	William	Simkulet
Retrieved	on:	16	November	2015
  
Frowe’s Machine Cases 
 
William Simkulet 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Helen Frowe (2006/2010) contends that there is a substantial moral 
difference between killing and letting die, arguing that in Michael Tooley's 
infamous machine case it is morally wrong to flip a coin to determine who 
lives or dies. Here I argue that Frowe fails to show that killing and letting die 
are morally inequivalent. However, I believe that she has succeeded in 
showing that it is wrong to press the button in Tooley's case, where pressing 
the button will change who lives and dies. I argue that because killing and 
letting die are morally equivalent we have no reason to press the button in the 
machine case. Pressing the button in this case is morally wrong because there 
is no reason to do it; to press the button is to treat matters of life and death 
irreverently. 
 
Introduction 
In Helen Frowe's “Killing John to Save Mary: A Defense of the Moral 
Distinction between Killing and Letting Die,” she argues that there is a 
substantial moral difference between killing and letting die. She sets out to 
demonstrate the difference by analyzing Michael Tooley's machine case: 
 
1. Machine – Two children – John and Mary – have been placed 
inside two chambers in a machine. Between the two chambers is a 
canister of poison gas that will shortly be released into Mary’s 
chamber. However, if a passerby presses a button on the machine, the 
gas will be released into John’s chamber instead.1 
 
                                                          
1 For the original version of this case, see Tooley (1980). For the purposes of each case discussed 
in this paper assume the agents involved are infallible about the consequences of their actions 
unless otherwise noted. 
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Tooley infamously contends that because killing and letting die are morally 
equivalent2, the passerby ought to flip a coin to decide whether to press the 
button. Frowe argues that the passerby shouldn't press the button, nor should 
he flip a coin to decide whether to press the button because (1) there is a 
significant moral difference between killing and letting die (killing is worse) 
and (2) pressing the button would be a case of redirecting harm from one 
person to another – from Mary to John – and thus pressing the button is 
worse than doing nothing. Frowe argues that it is only acceptable to 
redistribute harm to others if they have what she calls "a "fair chance" to 
avoid being at risk of harm." (59) Frowe constructs a series of cases that she 
believes illustrates these two points. 
 This paper is divided into three sections. In the first, I look at Frowe's 
argument that killing and letting die are inequivalent. I argue that Frowe fails 
to show that there is a morally significant difference between killing and 
letting die. In the second, I look at Frowe's theory of redirecting harm, and 
argue that it is inconsistent with our commonsense moral intuitions regarding 
self-defense. Despite this, I contend that Frowe has given us the tools to show 
that pressing the button in the machine case is morally wrong regardless of 
whether killing and letting die are equivalent. In the third section I argue that 
if killing and letting die are morally equivalent, then the outcome of pressing 
the button is morally equivalent to the outcome of not pressing the button. As 
the outcomes are (by assumption) equivalent - either Mary dies or John dies - 
the agent lacks any moral reason to intervene. To press the button, then, is at 
least prima facie morally wrong because it is a waste of time and effort. 
Furthermore, there is another reason why we shouldn't press the button - or 
flip a coin - in this case - it treats matters of life and death irreverently. 
 
I. On Killing and Letting Die 
To illustrate the difference between killing and letting die, Frowe compares 
the following two cases: 
 
2. Disease – Both JohnD and MaryD have a fatal disease. Their doctor 
has a single dose of the antidote. “Neither John nor Mary has any prior 
claim upon the antidote.” (Frowe, 57) 
                                                          
2 To use James Rachels' terminology, all else being equal there are the same reasons against 
killing as there are letting die, and thus killing and letting die are morally equivalent.  See 
Rachels (1975), (1979), (2001). 
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3. Diseased Mary – MaryDM has a fatal, non-communicable disease.  
She is trapped in a room with JohnDM (sedated) and the instructions 
and materials necessary to make the cure – a gas poisonous to those 
without the disease.  She will die before help arrives to free either of 
them from the room. 
 
Frowe contends that in Disease, “one ought to toss a coin” to determine who 
lives; but in Diseased Mary “one should not toss a coin to see whether Mary 
can permissibly [kill] John.” (57) There are two problems with comparing 
these cases to the machine case - (1) flipping the coin plays a different role in 
Machine than it does in Disease, and (2) Diseased Mary differs from Disease 
in that there is no impartial third party. 
 For Tooley, in Machine, the passerby finds himself caught in a Buridan's 
ass-type situation. He believes that all life is precious, and after examining 
the machine and trying to see if he can free both of the children, he concludes 
that there are only two options - (a) press the button (kill John, save Mary) or 
(b) not press the button (let Mary die, let John live). For Tooley, the coin flip 
serves as an ad hoc subjectively-indeterministic tie-break to free the passerby 
from his indecision. Tooley's passerby believes that both options are morally 
equivalent, and yet he has to choose between the two (otherwise he'd be 
stuck, unable to make a choice, like Buridan's Ass was said to be stuck 
indefinitely between two equally appetizing options, unable to choose 
between them). 
 In contrast, in Disease, for Frowe, flipping the coin is used as a fair and 
impartial means to determine who gets the antidote. JohnD and MaryD are 
equally deserving, but only one can get the antidote. Here the coin flip serves 
as an ad hoc subjectively-indeterministic tie-breaker, but unlike in Tooley's 
case, the coin flip is supposed to makes the outcome fair.   
 To illustrate this difference, suppose two passersby pass by Tooley's 
machine. The first finds herself equally drawn to pressing the button and not 
pressing it, and flips a coin to decide what she will do. Let's say she presses 
the button, redirecting the harm from Mary to John. The second passerby also 
flips a coin, then flips the switch redirecting the harm back from John to 
Mary. If the coin flip is an indeterministic means of breaking her mental 
stalemate, the first passerby might notice the second pressing the button - 
undoing her work - but she would have no reason to be offended or to go 
back and press the button again. 
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 In contrast, suppose two doctors enter the room in Disease. For Frowe, 
the coin flip determines the just outcome. If a second doctor stopped the 
administration of the antidote and flipped a second coin, then gave it to the 
winner of the second coin flip rather than the first, this would be considered 
unfair and the first doctor would have a moral reason to intervene. 
 The second problem with Frowe's analysis turns on the fact that Diseased 
Mary is unlike the previous two cases in that there is no impartial third party.  
Coin-flips in both Machine and Disease were used by impartial third parties 
to guide their actions. Here Mary is not an impartial third party. The relevant 
question here is whether Mary is morally justified to kill in self-defense. 
Commonsense ethics, and many normative ethical theories, seem to hold that 
it is morally acceptable for innocent persons to kill other innocent persons in 
self-defense. Although such cases are rare, it is generally accepted that when 
all else is equal, we can put our own well-being ahead of that of others. Mary 
is justified in creating the cure that will incidentally kill John in Diseased 
Mary because she is acting in self-defense. For Frowe’s purposes, though, we 
need a revised case:  
 
3a. Diseased Mary in the Machine – JohnDMM and MaryDMM – have 
been placed inside two chambers in a machine separated by a thin 
plastic wall. MaryDMM has a fatal, non-communicable disease. In 
JohnDMM’s chamber are all of the instructions and materials for 
making the cure – a gas fatal to those without the disease. By pressing 
a button on the machine, a passerby can dissolve the plastic wall 
between the two chambers. 
 
Unlike Diseased Mary, this case is not a case of self-defense. 
 Frowe says “One way that we can explain the difference between Disease 
and Diseased Mary is by thinking about the courses of action that we could 
justify to John.” (57) There are two substantive flaws with this stance. First, 
if we're interested in justifying our potential actions, we should be equally 
interested in justifying them to Mary as we are in justifying them to John. 
 Second, there is a substantive difference between justifying an act and 
justifying an act to John; the latter seems to imply that we need John's 
permission to morally engage in the act - in this case putting John in danger - 
but I suspect many wouldn't be inclined to consent to being put in danger, 
even if doing so was morally acceptable. For example, most people believe 
that killing in self-defense is morally acceptable - especially killing vicious 
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agents who freely put your life at risk. Suppose a vicious murderer kidnaps 
you and locks you in a cage deep in his basement and that, while readying his 
weapons, he explains that he is going to kill you. It occurs to you, however, 
that you might be able to save yourself if you kill him first. It would be quite 
absurd to suggest that you would need to be able to (counterfactually) justify 
your act of self-defense to the killer in order to kill in self-defense. 
 Most moral philosophers would have no trouble justifying the right to kill 
in self-defense, but it is a radically different question whether or not such a 
justification would be sufficient to justify it to the killer. Whether we can 
justify our action to the killer is irrelevant to whether or not we can kill the 
killer in self-defense. 
 In Disease, Frowe contends both John and Mary would consent to a coin 
flip deciding their fate; but that “In Diseased Mary John has no reason to 
agree to a third party’s tossing a coin to decide whether Mary can 
manufacture the gas.” (58) It's not clear that a third party has any bearing 
over Mary's actions in Diseased Mary, so for our purposes Frowe would 
contend that in Diseased Mary in the Machine John would have no reason to 
agree to the passerby's tossing a coin to decide whether to press the button.  
Still, this line of reasoning raises three problems.   
 First, it's not clear that Mary and John wouldn't advocate for some other 
ad hoc arbitrary decision making convention, such as "first-come, first 
served," the outcome of a game of checkers, etc. If we stipulate Mary and 
John are rational, self-interested individuals, then there's no reason to think 
they'd consent to a truly impartial decision making method at all - they'd 
prefer the method that would give them the best chance to live. This 
illustrates an important unparallel between Frowe's analysis of Disease and 
Diseased Mary - Mary's interests aren't consulted in the latter, and thus 
Frowe puts Mary at a disadvantage. 
 This unparallel is the second problem with Frowe's analysis. Here, Frowe 
seems to be begging the question - assuming that there is a morally relevant 
difference between killing and letting die, such that our actions need to be 
justified to John more so than Mary, because we'd be killing John, but merely 
letting Mary die. However, killing and letting die each affect the dying 
equally, so if we're interested in justifying our actions, we should be 
interested in what justification the passerby in Diseased Mary in the Machine 
could give to both parties to justify treating them unequally, to justify letting 
the person who put them in the machine decide their fate, or to justify letting 
luck (the flipping of a coin) decide who lives and who dies. Frowe contends 
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pressing the button cannot be justified to John, but certainly his inaction 
would be comparably uncomforting for Mary! 
 Third, Frowe's reliance on justification here seems inherently misguided - 
in some cases, John might agree to be killed to save Mary's life. Perhaps John 
is altruistic, perhaps he's suicidal. If John's consent matters here, this is 
morally relevant, such that Frowe should at least consider that in some cases 
killing might be preferable to letting die - when one has the consent of both 
parties. 
 
II. On Redirecting Harm 
Killing is wrong in Machine, Frowe contends, because it is redirecting harm 
to John “and John is not part of the lethal sequence of events that threatens 
Mary’s life.” (58) Frowe contends that it is not always wrong to redirect 
harms; she says doing so would be acceptable in cases like the following: 
 
4. Body Armor – Aggressor shoots at Victim. Bystander is nearby and 
can protect herself by putting on body armor, but refuses “because 
protective clothing is unflattering.” (58-59) Victim can save himself 
only by deflecting a bullet towards Bystander.3 
 
The relevant difference between Body Armor and Machine, she contends, is 
that Bystander had a prior chance to avoid even the risk of harm. Frowe 
contends “If the bystander had no chance to avoid her position… it is 
impermissible to kill [her] in… self-defense.” (59) This suggests that if the 
bystander had a chance to avoid putting herself in harm's way and failed to do 
so (whether intentionally or negligently), then it may be acceptable to kill her 
in self-defense. 
 By the same token, if there is no morally relevant difference between 
killing and letting die, then in Diseased Mary, MaryDM may be justified in 
acting to save her own life in such a way that will unintentionally kill JohnDM 
if JohnDM had previously had a chance to avoid being trapped in the room. 
Notably Frowe does not specify whether JohnDM could have avoided being 
locked in the room with MaryDM. 
 I agree that Victim would have different moral obligations towards a 
negligent Bystander than towards a virtuous Bystander; however her account 
in Body Armor is still radically inconsistent with our commonsense intuitions 
regarding killing in self-defense. Consider: 
                                                          
3 For the purposes of this and the following case, bullets are always lethal. 
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4a. No Body Armor – AggressorA shoots at VictimA with his last 
bullet. BystanderA is nearby – wrong place, wrong time. VictimA can 
save himself only by deflecting a bullet towards BystanderA. 
 
While tragic, my intuition is that VictimA is morally justified in acting in self-
defense, even at the possible cost of an innocent person’s life. (Of course 
VictimA might, like John, justifiable choose to put the life of others ahead of 
his own, but this isn't required.) Self-defense cases are generally problematic 
because even those committed to the view that everyone’s life is morally 
equivalent tend to have strong intuitions in favor of putting one's own life 
ahead of others in self-defense cases. One explanation is that (innocent) 
persons have a right to self-defense. Insofar as rights go, this one seems 
straightforward enough. Assuming moral agents have a right to life, in cases 
of scarcity and conflict there is a prima facie moral obligation to act to 
prevent conflict; but when there is no other course, killing in self-defense is 
prima facie morally acceptable. 
 However, because I am generally leery of rights-talk, an alternate 
explanation for why we are morally justified in choosing to preserve 
ourselves over others turns on our privileged access to our private mental 
states and moral history. For the moment, let's assume VictimA is a generally 
good person. If this is the case, all else being equal, VictimA has more reason 
to believe he is innocent than a stranger, and because he is morally obligated 
to favor innocent persons over villainous ones, he is obligated to favor 
himself over BystanderA. This does not mean that VictimA doesn’t have any 
moral obligations to BystanderA. If VictimA has the option to either deflect 
the bullet and certainly kill BystanderA or deflect it in such a way it would kill 
no one, all else being equal he is morally obligated to do the latter. Frowe 
contends that this kind of obligation would be lesser for “willing bystanders” 
in the same position as the one in Body Armor – but it would be quite odd if 
Frowe thinks that the killing would only be justified in terms of the relatively 
minor moral failing of being negligent. It's certainly not something that you 
can reliably justify to the negligent bystander, who - much like John - would 
probably vote against any action that would result in his death. 
 I think the privileged access account above is superior to the rights-based 
account because it explains our intuitions in rare cases where self-defense 
comes at a steep price. Consider the following case: 
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4b. Impending Nuclear Armageddon – Terrorists have hacked into a 
nuclear armed submarine, and have aimed the missiles at a large 
number of highly populated targets. The only way to stop these 
missiles from launching is to activate the convenient new "self-
destruct" system that responds to the captain's voice. As the captain 
begins uttering the self-destruct code, Ricky (a reporter covering the 
submarine) decides that he doesn't want to die and realizes that he can 
use his microphone cord to strangle the captain, preventing him to 
blowing up the ship, saving his life at the cost of millions of others.  
 
According to the rights-based theory, it is morally acceptable (but not 
obligatory) for Ricky to kill the captain. However, according to the privileged 
access theory, because Ricky has overwhelming evidence that killing the 
captain will result in the deaths of many innocent persons, it is unacceptable 
to do so.  Though, this is not to say that it is morally unacceptable to risk the 
lives of immoral persons to save yourself; consider this variation of Body 
Armor 
 
4c. Willing Spectators – Sparky has been enslaved and forced to fight 
in the Coliseum in front of legions of fight fans fully aware and 
apparently indifferent to the fact that he has been enslaved. One day, a 
lion lunges at Sparky, who has to choose whether to let the lion maw 
him, or to deflect the lion into the stands where he will no doubt kill 
many spectators.  
 
Just as Frowe thinks it is justifiable to deflect a bullet in Body Armor, I think 
it is acceptable to deflect the lion in Willing Spectators. Even if the immoral 
actions of the spectators are not worthy of death, I think their immoral action 
absolves Sparky – and us – from having to worry about their well-being in 
such a case. They might not have deserved to be killed, but they did fail, 
morally. In contrast, in Diseased Mary, even if it is morally acceptable for 
Mary to kill John to save her own life, she shouldn't be happy about it. 
 I have the strong intuition it is acceptable to kill in No Body Armor, but 
Frowe argues it is wrong to deflect harm onto innocents. Still, I suspect she 
would conclude it is morally acceptable to kill innocents who are the sources 
of possible harm to you, for example virtuous soldiers on opposing sides 
during war. It strikes me as odd that it would be acceptable to kill innocent 
persons trying to fulfill their moral obligations, but not innocent persons in 
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the wrong place at the wrong time. However, Frowe contends that it is 
acceptable to deflect the bullet in Body Armor solely because of Bystander’s 
moral failing, and contends it is never morally acceptable to kill “bystanders” 
(those who have not initiated a threat) in self-defense. Believing this, she 
turns to her penultimate case: 
 
5. Armed Machine – JohnAM and MaryAM – have been placed inside 
two chambers in a machine. MaryAM will be killed unless a passerby 
presses the button.  If the button is pressed, JohnAM will be killed in 
her stead. Their kidnapper has armed JohnAM and MaryAM with 
modified automatic-weapons fixed to the outside of the machine. The 
trustworthy kidnapper tells them that one of the weapons is loaded 
with live ammunition, and one is loaded with blanks, and that the 
weapons can only fire on a warm heat signature of a human being. 
 
Frowe contends that JohnAM would be morally justified in firing on the 
passerby if he tried to press the button because his trying to press the button 
would be a threat. Although killing the passerby would get MaryAM nothing, 
Frowe asks whether MaryAM might be justified in shooting him in the knee 
and promising further force if he doesn’t press the button. If MaryAM’s action 
is justified, Frowe says, “we are committed to the implausible claim that one 
may use seriously harmful means to force a person to come to one’s aid at the 
cost of an innocent person’s [JohnAM’s] life.” (61) While regrettable, I don’t 
find this implausible. Indeed, this is what I contend is acceptable in No Body 
Armor; that one is morally justified in acting in self-defense even at the cost 
of the life of an innocent person. 
 If MaryAM is not justified in using this force, Frowe contends, it supports 
the view that there is a substantial difference between killing and letting die.  
(61) She goes on to say “… that you may not do as much against someone 
who refuses to save you as you may do against someone who is going to kill 
you is sufficient to support the killing/letting die distinction.” This is just 
bizarre; consider a variation of Armed Machine: 
 
5a. Solo Machine – MarySM has been placed inside a machine that will 
release poison gas into her chamber when the clock hits zero unless 
someone presses a button. This is all very obvious to Mary and 
anyone who would pass her by. Her captors have given Mary a 
machine gun. 
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Suppose a numbers of passersby see MarySM's plight, see that it is easy for 
them to save her life, and freely choose not to do so. Certainly MarySM is 
morally justified in both threatening to kill bystanders who would let her die, 
as well as following through with her threat if they fail to save her life - 
especially if doing so might make other bystanders press the button. The very 
notion that a passerby might witness MarySM's plight and do nothing is 
morally abhorrent!  
 In Solo Machine, it seems that we can do as much against someone who 
refuses to save you as you may do against someone who is going to kill you - 
that is to say that there is no support for the killing/letting die distinction.  
The difference between Solo Machine and Armed Machine is that the 
passersby who freely let Mary die when saving her life would cost them next 
to nothing are uncontroversially moral monsters, while the passerby in Armed 
Machine certainly does not exhibit the same disregard for human life. If Mary 
is unjustified in acting in Armed Machine, surely it is because the character of 
her targets is different - they're not clear moral monsters for not killing an 
innocent person to save her life, where as in Solo Machine they would be 
clear moral monsters for letting her die for no reason. 
 
III. Killing Arbitrarily 
Frowe’s final case, I think, has the most merit: 
 
6. Blind Machine – A passerby comes across a machine in which two 
children have been placed inside separate chambers. A canister of gas 
is hidden out of view above one of the chambers. Pressing the button 
will change the chamber it is aimed at. 
 
There is no good reason to press the button here, as the passerby cannot tell 
who he will be killing and saving. Blind Machine illustrates the futility of 
flipping a coin in Machine. Because John and Mary are morally equivalent in 
Machine, there is nothing that the passerby can do that could bring about a 
morally different outcome. To press the button is to waste the passerby’s 
effort, and perhaps to cause additional psychological harm to those trapped in 
the machine. 
 Blind Machine doesn’t let Frowe help herself to the conclusion that 
killing is worse than letting die; pressing the button in Blind Machine is 
wrong because there is no reason to do so, and thus to press the button is to 
act irrationally and wastefully. Furthermore, pressing the button might cause 
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additional harm and suffering to those in the machine. Tooley’s position isn’t 
that killing and letting die are always morally equivalent, but that all else 
being equal, killing and letting die are morally equivalent. All Blind Machine 
has demonstrated is that Machine doesn’t quite make everything else 
equivalent. 
 Suppose, though, that the passerby presses the button in Blind Machine. 
And suppose that she does it often because she likes having control over who 
lives and dies. This, it strikes me, is morally abhorrent because the passerby 
is making life or death decisions without regard to morality; her actions aren't 
done for moral reasons, rather they're done in wanton defiance of morality. 
This is a particularly egregious form of willful negligence, what we might 
call "playing God" because it involves carelessness with matters great 
importance - of life and death. I think it is uncontroversially true that this 
passerby acts immorally, and is severely morally blameworthy for her 
actions. Note that the actual or expected consequences of her actions are 
irrelevant to explaining what's wrong with her choice. Suppose that she 
presses the button twice - the gas momentarily switches targets, but then 
switches back. This has no effect on the outcome, but the passerby is clearly 
morally blameworthy for her careless attitude towards the life and death of 
others. 
 
Conclusion 
We are now in a better position to explain what is wrong with pushing the 
button in Tooley's machine case. If moral agents have (libertarian) free will, 
then they're not like Buridan's ass - they can make (arbitrary) choices 
between two outcomes on their own without flipping a coin. (The doctors in 
Disease, while capable of making arbitrary choices, probably should use an 
impartial, observable decision making method to demonstrate that their 
decision was arbitrary.) We can sensibly say that the passerby has at least 
three options - press the button, don't press the button, or flip a coin to decide 
whether to press the button. If killing and letting die are morally equivalent, 
all three options have a morally equivalent outcome and we can't decide 
between them by consequences alone. Because pressing the button and 
flipping the coin involve some effort, the default circumstance - not pressing 
the button is preferable. To decide for any other reason is to make a decision 
based on irrelevant grounds and to treat matters of life and death as if they 
didn't matter - and this is morally abhorrent. 
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